Advisory
DNP3 Protocol Running on Cloud Infrastructure: A High-Weirdness ICS Exposure
An automated scan of internet-facing industrial control systems flagged DNP3 (port 20000) on a major cloud provider — a finding that warrants investigation by OT operators and researchers alike.
Published: September 10, 2026 | Author: Jeff Gray | Source: Global ICS Anomaly Hunter (Shodan API)
What Was Found
During a bi-weekly automated scan of internet-facing industrial control protocols, the Global ICS Anomaly Hunter flagged two high-scoring anomalies involving DNP3 (Distributed Network Protocol 3) — a widely used industrial protocol in North American electric utilities, water systems, and pipeline operations.
⚠ Finding #1 — Weirdness Score: 11 / 15
| Protocol | DNP3 (port 20000) |
| Product | IIS (Internet Information Services) |
| Network | Cloud Provider (defanged) |
| Location | US — Richardson (defanged) |
| Exposed Metric | MW (megawatt-scale control metric) |
Indicators
Consumer/IT service on industrial port 20000: IIS
ICS port 20000 on cloud provider
ICS device on cloud provider
Exposed control metric: MW
⚠ Finding #2 — Weirdness Score: 7 / 15
| Protocol | DNP3 (port 20000) |
| Product | nginx |
| Network | Los Angeles Municipal Court (defanged) |
| Location | US — Los Angeles (defanged) |
| Exposed Metric | PSI (pressure sensing) |
Indicators
Consumer/IT service on industrial port 20000: nginx
Exposed control metric: PSI
Why This Matters
DNP3 is a protocol designed for operational technology — power substations, water treatment plants, pipeline monitoring stations. It is not designed for cloud infrastructure. Finding it running on cloud platforms raises several critical questions:
- Is this a test lab or research environment? Security researchers and vendors sometimes expose ICS protocols for testing purposes without proper network segmentation.
- Is a real OT system being hosted on cloud infrastructure? While increasingly common for SCADA data historians, real-time control protocols should never be directly internet-accessible.
- Is the exposed metric meaningful? The presence of MW (megawatt) and PSI (pressure) values suggests actual operational data may be exposed — not just protocol handshake banners.
Broader Context
This scan also identified:
- 25 total anomalies across 4 ICS protocol queries (Modbus, Siemens S7, IEC-104, DNP3)
- 6 Moxa devices found in the Smart Grid sector — industrial networking gear with port 102 (S7) exposure across multiple cloud providers
- Zero results for Vestas, Siemens Gamesa, GE Wind, SCADAPack, Motorola MOSCAD, Xylem, and Advantech targeted queries — confirming these vendors maintain tighter internet exposure posture
Methodology
Data collected via Shodan Developer API with targeted queries across 4 ICS protocols. Queries executed: ics_hmis (Modbus port 502, China), unauth_ics (S7 port 102, Iran), geopolitical_ics (IEC-104 port 2404, Russia), dnp3_us_east (DNP3 port 20000, US). Anomalies scored using a multi-factor weirdness algorithm accounting for protocol mismatch, cloud provider hosting, product type, and exposed operational metrics. All IPs and organization names defanged per non-attribution policy.
What Operators Should Do
- Audit your cloud footprint. If your organization uses cloud infrastructure, verify that no ICS protocols (Modbus/502, S7/102, IEC-104/2404, DNP3/20000) are exposed to the internet.
- Segment test environments. Lab and research environments running ICS protocols must be isolated from public internet access.
- Monitor for protocol exposure. Use Shodan, Censys, or similar services to periodically scan your own IP ranges for unexpected ICS protocol banners.
- Review cloud security groups. Ensure default security group rules do not permit inbound traffic on ICS protocol ports.