Advisory

DNP3 Protocol Running on Cloud Infrastructure: A High-Weirdness ICS Exposure

An automated scan of internet-facing industrial control systems flagged DNP3 (port 20000) on a major cloud provider — a finding that warrants investigation by OT operators and researchers alike.

Published: September 10, 2026 | Author: Jeff Gray | Source: Global ICS Anomaly Hunter (Shodan API)

What Was Found

During a bi-weekly automated scan of internet-facing industrial control protocols, the Global ICS Anomaly Hunter flagged two high-scoring anomalies involving DNP3 (Distributed Network Protocol 3) — a widely used industrial protocol in North American electric utilities, water systems, and pipeline operations.

⚠ Finding #1 — Weirdness Score: 11 / 15

ProtocolDNP3 (port 20000)
ProductIIS (Internet Information Services)
NetworkCloud Provider (defanged)
LocationUS — Richardson (defanged)
Exposed MetricMW (megawatt-scale control metric)

Indicators

Consumer/IT service on industrial port 20000: IIS ICS port 20000 on cloud provider ICS device on cloud provider Exposed control metric: MW

⚠ Finding #2 — Weirdness Score: 7 / 15

ProtocolDNP3 (port 20000)
Productnginx
NetworkLos Angeles Municipal Court (defanged)
LocationUS — Los Angeles (defanged)
Exposed MetricPSI (pressure sensing)

Indicators

Consumer/IT service on industrial port 20000: nginx Exposed control metric: PSI

Why This Matters

DNP3 is a protocol designed for operational technology — power substations, water treatment plants, pipeline monitoring stations. It is not designed for cloud infrastructure. Finding it running on cloud platforms raises several critical questions:

Broader Context

This scan also identified:

Methodology

Data collected via Shodan Developer API with targeted queries across 4 ICS protocols. Queries executed: ics_hmis (Modbus port 502, China), unauth_ics (S7 port 102, Iran), geopolitical_ics (IEC-104 port 2404, Russia), dnp3_us_east (DNP3 port 20000, US). Anomalies scored using a multi-factor weirdness algorithm accounting for protocol mismatch, cloud provider hosting, product type, and exposed operational metrics. All IPs and organization names defanged per non-attribution policy.

What Operators Should Do

  1. Audit your cloud footprint. If your organization uses cloud infrastructure, verify that no ICS protocols (Modbus/502, S7/102, IEC-104/2404, DNP3/20000) are exposed to the internet.
  2. Segment test environments. Lab and research environments running ICS protocols must be isolated from public internet access.
  3. Monitor for protocol exposure. Use Shodan, Censys, or similar services to periodically scan your own IP ranges for unexpected ICS protocol banners.
  4. Review cloud security groups. Ensure default security group rules do not permit inbound traffic on ICS protocol ports.